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SENTENCING LUXURY:
THE VALUATION DEBATE IN SENTENCING
TRAFFICKERS OF COUNTERFEIT LUXURY
GOODS
Jana Nicole Checa Chong*
This Note examines the contentious debate that exists regarding the
property valuation used by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines with regard to
counterfeiting. Currently, the Sentencing Guidelines employ "street
value." However, many scholars and organizations argue that the
alternative use of "retail value " will best assess the harm to the intellectual
property owner as well as combat the growing problem of counterfeiting.
This Note suggests that amending the Sentencing Guidelines, in order to
allow for application of "retail value, "will best combat a growing national
and international problem posed by the counterfeit luxury goods market.
INTRODUCTION
Luxury- (1) lasciviousness, lust .. .(2) luxuriance .. .(3) the habitual
use of, or indulgence in what is choice or costly, whether food, dress,
furniture, or appliances of any kind... (4) refined and intense enjoyment
... (5)... means of luxurious enjoyment; sumptuous and exquisite food
or surroundings . . . (6) luxuriousness; abundance of appliances for
comfort .... I
The thirst for the sometimes unobtainable can force some people to do
just about anything to obtain a moment of extravagance that symbolizes
privilege and social status. A startling trend has long existed where young
girls work as prostitutes in order to purchase luxury goods.2 In the 1961
movie adaptation of Albert Moravia's novel, La Ciociara, a girl in post-
World War II Italy goes home with a man and instead of being paid for her
"services" requests a pair of nylons.3 This trend has extended the postwar
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Susan Scafidi for her invaluable guidance and advice during the writing process. Thank you
to my parents and sister for their endless love, support, and inspiration, and to my friends for
their constant encouragement.
1. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 128-29 (2d ed. 1989).
2. See DANA THOMAS, DELUXE: How LUXURY LOST ITS LUSTER 11 (2007) (discussing
the existence of this trend in Japan).
3. ALBERTO MORAVIA, Two WOMEN (1958). The movie starring Sophia Loren was
known in the United States as Two Women. Two WOMEN (Compagnia Cinematografica
Champion 1961).
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Europe of the past into today's society. Dana Thomas, in her exploratory
book, tells a story of this continued trend:
A rich, hip New York banker met a pretty Russian girl in the bar of the
H6tel Byblos in Saint-Tropez late one night and took her home with him.
The next morning, she told him pointedly: "I could really use a new pair
of Gucci shoes." He understood immediately that she was a working girl
and took out his wallet. "No," she said, "Gucci shoes." And to the store
they went.4
With the desire to obtain an item of luxury plaguing the general public, it is
not surprising that the counterfeit market has been willing to serve those
desires. Those who cannot afford to purchase the $800 Louis Vuitton "it"
bag have been given alternative routes to own the sacred "LV." The
perceived need to obtain status through luxury items creates what many,
including writer James B. Twitchell, believe to be quite a paradox about
luxury items and whether displaying their logo is enough:
[m]any people who drink Evian water simply refill the bottle from the tap.
But others insist on purchasing the brand then tossing the container when
[they are] finished. And it's those consumers who tell us something about
the shift in luxury, the shift from moving outward to moving inward, from
conspicuous consumption to consumption as reward, from display to
epiphany. 5
The counterfeit market for luxury goods has been a powerful problem that
most governments have been unable to defeat.
The United States has taken intellectual property rights seriously and
over the last twenty years has made significant progress in enacting
trademark and copyright protections. Attempting to match the public policy
determination that the trafficking of counterfeits needs to be curtailed, the
U.S. Sentencing Commission has continued to amend the Sentencing
Guidelines to provide for adequate penalties.6 However, the valuation
determination that the Guidelines incorporate has led us to a scenario where
punishment is determined by a calculation based on either the "street value"
or "retail value" of the items. 7 The application of the appropriate valuation
has an effect on the continuation of trafficking of counterfeit luxury goods.
4. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 12.
5. JAMES B. TWITCHELL, LIVING IT UP: AMERICA'S LOVE AFFAIR WITH LUXURY 122
(2002).
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines discuss the use of the "retail value of [an] infringed
item" versus the use of the "retail value of [an] infringing item." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3 cmt. n.2 (2006). For clarity, this Note refers to the "retail
value of infringing item" as "street value" and the "retail value of the infringed item" as
"retail value." The street value of an item, as referenced in this Note, refers to the price at
which a counterfeit item is sold on the street. For example, a counterfeit Kate Spade
handbag's street value would be the $25 it is sold for on the street. On the other hand, the
retail value references the price of the actual item being counterfeited. For example, the
retail value of the counterfeit Kate Spade handbag would be $225, the price the actual Kate
Spade handbag is sold for in a store.
[Vol. 771148
2008] COUNTERFEIT LUXURY GOODS TRAFFICKERS
Applications of the Sentencing Guidelines have favored application of
street value and, arguably, as a result have had little effect on decreasing the
illegal activity. With Congress's continued efforts to provide more
protection for intellectual property rights as well as public policy decisions
to end counterfeiting, the need for a re-examination of the Sentencing
Guidelines is pressing. Moreover, current court sentencing decisions, such
as United States v. Diallo,8 cast suspicion on whether the current
Sentencing Guidelines are appropriate.
Part I of this Note discusses the magnitude and depth of the counterfeit
luxury goods trade and how the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines currently
outline punishment. It also examines the history of governmental action in
this area. Part II discusses the different approaches to valuation-retail vs.
street-and how they interplay with the current and future Sentencing
Guidelines. Part II also presents the political and theoretical support for
both approaches. Part III urges the Sentencing Commission to amend the
Guidelines to provide for an easier application of retail value.
I. ATTEMPTS TO ERODE THE COUNTERFEIT LUXURY GOODS MARKET
The counterfeit luxury goods market has risen to a level that challenges
the protections provided by intellectual property laws. This part tracks the
development of trademark law to encompass protections and create rights
for intellectual property owners. Additionally, this part looks at Congress
and the Executive branch and how they have worked toward great
protection in these areas. Next, this part examines the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines and the proper methodology for sentencing those who are found
guilty of trafficking in counterfeit goods. Ultimately, this part examines the
full effect of the counterfeit luxury goods market.
A. The Importance of Protecting Intellectual Property Rights
Congressional development of trademark law shows a continued policy
choice to expand the protection of intellectual property rights. 9  The
importance of expanding such protection is seen by the development of
federal counterfeiting laws. Looking to both the legislative history of
trademark protection and current anticounterfeiting laws, it is evident that
our government values intellectual property rights and will continue to
develop protections in this area.
1. An Historical Look at the Development of Trademark Protection and
Anticounterfeiting Laws
Intellectual property rights find their source in what is known as the
"Intellectual Property Clause" of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes
Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by
8. 476 F. Supp. 2d 497 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
9. See infra Part I.A.1-2.
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 0 While federal copyright and
patent law find their source in the above clause, federal trademark law finds
its source in the Commerce Clause." 1 The first comprehensive trademark
legislation passed by Congress was the Trademark Act of 1870.12 Today,
the main source of trademark protection is found in the Lanham Act,
originally passed in 1946.13 The Lanham Act protects sellers and producers
of goods and services from competitors by prohibiting the
(1) [Use of] any counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
trademark [that have been registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office] in connection with the sale ... of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive .... 14
(2) [Uses] in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact... which-
(a) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(b) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities. 15
In addition to the above provisions, the Lanham Act also grants owners of
"famous" trademarks the right to seek injunctive relief against someone
who is using in commerce "a mark or trade name" if its use causes "dilution
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
11. Id. cf. 3. In the Trade-Mark Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court held the first federal
trademark act to be unconstitutional because it was enacted pursuant to the Copyright and
Patent Clause: "Any attempt ... to identify the essential characteristics of a trade-mark with
inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences, or with the writings of authors, will show
that the effort is surrounded with insurmountable difficulties." 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
Subsequent federal trademark laws avoided this problem because they were adopted
pursuant to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, foreign commerce, and
commerce with the Native American tribes. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: FEDERAL CIVIL
REMEDIES AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES RELATED TO COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND PATENTS
I n.3 (2007).
12. The Trademark Act of 1870 was a result of federal overhaul of copyright and patent
law. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. The Act permitted federal trademark rights
for "individuals or corporations who registered their marks in the Patent Office." JANE C.
GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 13
(4th ed. 2007). The Supreme Court later struck down this Act in 1889. Id.
13. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006)).
14. See id. § 1114(1).
15. See id. § 1125(a)(1).
1150 [Vol. 77
2008] COUNTERFEIT LUXURY GOODS TRAFFICKERS
by blurring or tamishment of the distinctive quality of the famous
trademark."16
The Lanham Act provides for civil penalties only. At the same time,
Congress recognized that the lack of criminal penalties for "counterfeiting
was harming certain sectors of the U.S. Economy."' 7 To solve this
problem, Congress passed the Phonograph Records-Counterfeit Labels Act
of 1962, which criminalized trafficking in counterfeit labels.' 8 Ultimately,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which
provided for federal penalties of counterfeits. 19 The corresponding Senate
report explained that there are "virtually no criminal penalties for the sale of
goods and services through the use of false trademarks," and as a result it
had "emboldened counterfeiters, who now defraud consumers out of
billions of dollars each year in the United States alone." 20 The intent of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act was to empower federal prosecutors and
trademark owners with the "essential tools for combating this insidious and
rapidly growing form of commercial fraud."'2 1  The growth of the
counterfeit goods trade led Congress to pass the Anticounterfeiting
Consumer Protection Act of 1996.22 This Act added "'trafficking in goods
or services bearing counterfeit marks' as a predicate act under RICO. '23
Passage of this legislation signified Congress's acknowledgment that
counterfeiting had become more than just an economic problem due to the
growing connection to organized crime. 24 The Act has been just one of a
number of laws passed by Congress to signify the importance of protecting
intellectual property rights and fighting the counterfeit market.
2. Current Action by Congress and the Executive Branch
Congress has continued to pass legislation that extends further protection
to intellectual property owners in light of the expanding counterfeit market.
In addition, executive agencies have begun to highlight the problems caused
by counterfeiting in order to change public perception of the problem. The
16. YEH, supra note 11, at 2; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(c)(1).
17. Debra D. Peterson, Criminal Counterfeiting and Component Parts: Closing the
Perceived "Label Loophole, " 30 AIPLA Q.J. 457, 468 (2002).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (2006).
19. This Act resulted in the creation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320.
20. S. REP. No. 98-526, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627.
21. Peterson, supra note 17, at 469 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-526, at 1, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627).
22. Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2320). "Unfortunately,
no one predicted the phenomenal growth of the crime of counterfeiting, nor the increased
availability of technology that makes counterfeiting both easy and inexpensive." S. REP. No.
104-177, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074.
23. Lauren D. Amendolara, Note, Knocking Out Knock-Offs: Effectuating the
Criminalization of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 789, 801 (2005).
24. Id. at 801-02. For extensive legislative history on the Anticounterfeiting Consumer
Protection Act of 1996, see Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci.
& TECH. 235, 240 (1999).
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current action of both Congress and the executive branch shows the public
policy determination to work toward an end of counterfeit luxury goods.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided a pivotal
decision in the realm of counterfeiting in 2000 in the case of United States
v. Giles.25 The court held that "an individual who sold patches with a
counterfeit trademark for placement on counterfeit products to make them
appear genuine was not guilty of criminal counterfeiting because he did not
traffic in 'goods."' 26 The result in Giles led Congress to consider whether
the current statutes were too restrictive.27 The result was the passage of the
Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act in 2006,28 which amended
title 18 of the U.S. Code in terms of the criminal penalties provided for
trafficking in counterfeit marks. 29 Within the Act, Congress included
various findings that highlighted the plague caused by counterfeit goods
today, including,
(A) the United States economy is losing millions of dollars in tax revenue
and tens of thousands of jobs because of the manufacture, distribution,
and sale of counterfeit goods;
(B) the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection estimates that
counterfeiting costs the United States $200 billion annually;
(E) ties have been established between counterfeiting and terrorist
organizations that use the sale of counterfeit goods to raise and launder
money. 30
The Stop Initiative forces an individual who is convicted of violating §
2320 to forfeit
any property amounting to or derived from any proceeds obtained through
trafficking in counterfeit goods, such as a house; any property used,. . . to
traffic in, or facilitate, aid or abet the trafficking of counterfeit goods,
such as a vehicle; and any property that displays or consists of a
counterfeit trademark.31
25. 213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000).
26. ANNE GILSON LALONDE, No MORE SHAM CHANEL, RIP-OFF ROLEX, PHONY
FERRAGAMO OR COPIED CARTIER?: ANTI-COUNTERFEITING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
107 (2006).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 108 n.294. "This modification is intended to overrule the holding in the
case United States v. Giles .. " Id. (quoting H.R. REP. 109-68, at 7 (2005)). "'This bill
closes a loophole that has allowed counterfeiters to avoid prosecution. Current law does not
prohibit trafficking in counterfeit labels, so many counterfeiters simply ship fake brand name
labels to warehouse and then traffic them to avoid prosecution."' Id. (quoting H.R. REP. 109-
68, at 19).
29. Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, 120 Stat. 285
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b)(1) (2006)).
30. Id. § l(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 285.
31. Sam Cocks, Note, The Hoods Who Move the Goods: An Examination of the
Booming International Trade in Counterfeit Luxury Goods and an Assessment of the
[Vol. 771152
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Including these mandatory forfeitures ensures that those convicted will
have some punishment that did not exist prior to this legislation. 32
Congress also expressed that "strong domestic criminal remedies against
counterfeiting will permit the United States to seek stronger
anticounterfeiting provisions in bilateral and international agreements with
trading partners. '33 The government continues to take a strong position
with respect to fighting the trafficking of counterfeit goods. Securing
protection of intellectual property rights and ending the trade has
continuously caused Congress to review the associated penalties. In May of
2007, the U.S. Justice Department sent to Congress the Intellectual Property
Protection Act of 2007, which calls for even stronger penalties, in hopes to
continue to curb the problem. 34
The last few years have also brought congressional and executive
attention to the role of China in the counterfeit trade. 35 Much of this
attention has been due to China's entering the World Trade Organization,
which subjected it to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement). 36 In responding to the growing
trend, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has increasingly worked to stop
imports of items labeled with counterfeit trademarks. Counterfeit items
coming from China and Hong Kong comprised about ninety percent of all
intellectual property seizures by U.S. Customs and Border Protection from
2005 to 2006. 37 Although much is done to stop and seize these items,
numerous shipments of counterfeit goods are still making it into the
country. 38
B. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines lay out how to calculate the punishment
for traffickers of counterfeit luxury goods. The Guidelines utilize a type of
valuation in order to calculate the penalties. The U.S. Sentencing
American Efforts to Curtail its Proliferation, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
501, 534 (2007) (explaining the Act).
32. See id. at 534.
33. Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act § l(a)(2)(G).
34. Jaroslaw Anders, US. Draft Law Would Toughen Penalties Against Counterfeit
Goods, AMERICA.GOV, May 14, 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/
May/20070514160707zjsredna0.9600336.html; see also BUSH ADMINISTRATION, STRATEGY
FOR TARGETING ORGANIZED PIRACY: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND INITIATIVES (2007).
35. See Stephen M. Pinkos, Deputy Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. &
Deputy Dir. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Piracy of Intellectual Property,
Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property
(May 25, 2005), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/2005may25
_pinkos.htm.
36. See Myron Brilliant, Vice President, East Asia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5-7 (June 7,
2006).
37. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 285.
38. Id.
1153
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
Commission has taken many things into consideration when deciding what
type of valuation to use.
Section 2320 of title 18 of the U.S. Code creates the offense of
"[t]rafficking in counterfeit goods or services. '39 The U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines outline the offense of criminal infringement of copyright or
trademark and the appropriate procedure of determining penalties under
sections 2B5.1 and 2B5.3. 40 In United States v. Booker, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were just that-
guidelines. 41 Striking down § 3553(b), the Supreme Court declared that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines no longer were mandatory.42 Moreover,
since the Booker decision, "district courts [now] have the discretion to
sentence individuals outside the sentencing ranges established in the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but they still must take the applicable
Guidelines range into consideration during sentencing." 43
Currently, the Sentencing Guidelines determine the infringement amount
by taking the street value of the items, the amount for which the counterfeit
item is sold, multiplied by the number of counterfeit items.44  The
calculation is only changed to use retail value if the case falls within one of
a number of enumerated situations in the commentary notes. These
situations include: whether a "reasonably informed purchaser" would
believe the counterfeit item to be identical or equivalent to the actual item;
the street value of the item is difficult to calculate and delays the sentencing
proceedings; the retail value is believed to be a better formula to assess the
pecuniary harm; the item includes the use of or is accompanied by a label or
other signifier of the logo that would cause an informer to be mistaken as to
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2006). The statute reads,
(a) Whoever intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and
knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or
services, or intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in labels, patches, stickers,
wrappers, badges, emblems, medallions, charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases,
hangtags, documentation, or packaging of any type or nature, knowing that a
counterfeit mark has been applied thereto, the use of which is likely to cause
confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall, if an individual, be fined not more
than $2,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, and if a person
other than an individual, be fined not more than $5,000,000 ....
Id.
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B5.1, 2B5.3 (2006).
41. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). Since United States v. Booker,
many cases have examined the proper use of guidelines for sentencing and whether the
Booker Court was correct in their findings. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456
(2007); Claibome v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007). Cases like United States v. Mix,
450 F.3d 375 (9th Cir. 2006), embody a national trend of longer sentences since Booker. See
Posting of Steven Kalar to Ninth Circuit Blog, http://circuit9.blogspot.com/2006/04/case-o-
week-mix-ed-booker-decision.html (Apr. 1, 2006, 17:34 EST).
42. Booker, 543 U.S. at 220.
43. Counterfeit Law Blog: Sentences, http://www.counterfeitlawblog.com/archives/cat-
sentences.html (Aug. 1, 2006).
44. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3 cmt. n.2(B) (noting that the
infringement amount "is the retail value of the infringing item[] multiplied by the number of
infringing items").
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the authenticity of the item.45 Aside from these categories, the Sentencing
Guidelines put a presumption on the use of street value.
The Sentencing Commission added two "encouraged upward departure
grounds" to section 2B5.3. 46 The two grounds were, (1) "when the offense
involved substantial harm to the reputation of the copyright or trademark
owner" 47 and (2) "when the offense was committed in connection with, or
in furtherance of, the criminal activities of a national, or international
organized criminal enterprise." 48 Both of these departures were added in
response to public comment. 49  Public comment called for the first
departure because there was a general worry that "infringement may cause
substantial harm to the reputation of the copyright or trademark owner that
is not accounted for in the monetary calculation of the infringement
amount." 50
This choice of valuation was not always the case. Prior to the 2000
amendments of the relevant sections, "the monetary calculation for all
intellectual property crimes was based on the retail value of the infringing
45. The language of comment n.2(A) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 2B5.3
lays out the categories as follows:
(i) The infringing item (I) is, or appears to a reasonably informed purchaser to be,
identical or substantially equivalent to the infringed item; or (II) is a digital or
electronic reproduction of the infringed item.
(ii) The retail price of the infringing item is not less than 75% of the retail price of
the infringed item.
(iii) The retail value of the infringing item is difficult or impossible to determine
without unduly complicating or prolonging the sentencing proceeding.
(iv) The offense involves the illegal interception of a satellite cable transmission in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 ....
(v) The retail value of the infringed item provides a more accurate assessment of
the pecuniary harm to the copyright or trademark owner than does the retail value
of the infringing item.
(vi) The offense involves the display, performance, publication, reproduction, or
distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution. In a case
involving such an offense, the "retail value of the infringed item" is the value of
that item upon its initial commercial distribution.
(vii) A case under 18 U.S.C. § 2318 or § 2320 that involves a counterfeit label,
patch, sticker, wrapper, badge, emblem, medallion, charm, box, container, can,
case, hangtag, documentation, or packaging of any type or nature (I) that has not
been affixed to, or does not enclose or accompany a good or service; and (II)
which, had it been so used, would appear to a reasonably informed purchaser to be
affixed to, enclosing or accompanying an identifiable, genuine good or service. In
such a case, the "infringed item" is the identifiable, genuine good or service.
Id. cmt. n.2(A).
46. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AMENDMENTS: 2006: POLICY
DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT 6 (2006) [hereinafter POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT].
47. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3 cmt. n.4(A).
48. POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 6; see also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES §2B5.3 cmt. n.4(B).
49. See POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 6. "Public comment to
the Commission also indicated that some copyright and trademark offenses are committed in
connection with, or in furtherance of, the criminal activities of certain organized crime
enterprises." Id.
50. Id.
1155
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
item multiplied by the quantity of infringing items. '' 51 The change to street
value was done in response to the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act. 52 In
explaining the reason for the change, the Sentencing Commission stated,
"The Commission believed that use of that calculation would provide a
reasonable approximation for those classes of infringement cases in which
it is highly likely that the sale of an infringing item results in a displaced
sale of the legitimate, infringed item." 53
Furthermore, in deciding to change the valuation standard, the
Sentencing Commission looked to cases sentenced under the original
version of section 2B5.3. 54 In so doing, the Commission found "that using
the [retail value] likely would overstate substantially the pecuniary harm
caused to copyright and trademark owners in some cases currently
sentenced under the guideline." 55 In assessing the problem with using retail
value as the base level of determining the infringing amount, the
Commission justified abandoning the retail value standard by estimating
that it was a more accurate assessment of the revenue lost:
[A] one-to-one correlation between the sale of infringing items and the
displaced sale of legitimate, infringed items is unlikely because the
inferior quality of the infringing item and/or the greatly discounted price
at which it is sold suggests that many purchasers of infringing items
would not, or could not, have purchased the infringed item in the absence
of the availability of the infringing item.56
Finding that the best way to assess the pecuniary harm resulting from the
counterfeit items was to adopt street value, the Sentencing Commission
expressly decided not to place a presumption on retail value when it
amended the Sentencing Guidelines in 2000. 57
In practice, the presumption to apply street value is evidenced by recent
decisions. In Diallo, Mamadou Diallo was caught driving through Mercer
County, Pennsylvania with over three hundred items of clothing, jewelry,
and handbags. 58 All of these items bore the trademarks of several luxury
designers, particularly Louis Vuitton.59 It was at least the third time that
Diallo had been caught trafficking counterfeit luxury goods.60 Diallo was
51. Id. at 4-5.
52. See id. at 4; see also No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678
(codified in scattered sections of 17 and 18 U.S.C.).
53. POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 5; see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, No ELECTRONIC THEFT ACT: POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT 22 (1999).
54. These cases were all decided when the infringement amount was based on the retail
value multiplied by the number of infringing items. POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT,
supra note 46, at 5.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. United States v. Diallo, 476 F. Supp. 2d 497, 498 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
59. Id.
60. Id. Mamadou Diallo had been caught in 2003 attempting to sell about 700
counterfeit handbags at the Peddler's Mall in Indianapolis, Indiana. Id. at 499. In 2004,
[Vol. 771156
2008] COUNTERFEIT LUXURY GOODS TRAFFICKERS
found guilty of trafficking in goods bearing counterfeit trademarks in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a).61
When it came to sentencing, federal prosecutors asked the court to
impose "a sentence of 33 to 41 months in prison" based "on the cost of the
genuine versions of the goods that Diallo sold-approximately
$215,000."62 While the prosecutor relied on retail value to determine the
appropriate sentence, Diallo's lawyers "argued that the sentence should be
based on what Diallo would have sold the counterfeits for-around
$10,000. '63 U.S. District Court Judge Nora Barry Fischer agreed with the
defendant and applied the street value in determining the infringement
amount because she found the prosecution unable to meet the categories set
out in the Sentencing Guidelines. 64 Notably, the court found that "given the
context of the purchase of the items (i.e. at a flea market) and the price of
the items, such items could not appear to a reasonably informed purchaser
to be identical or substantially equivalent to the infringed items" and also
concluded that the retail value "does not provide an accurate assessment of
the pecuniary harm to the copyright or trademark owner." 65 Instead the
street value "provides a more accurate assessment of the harm." 66
Moreover, the Court used the fact that Diallo was selling the counterfeit
items at a price that was "significantly less than 75% of the price of the
infringed items" to show that you could not invoke retail value under the
Sentencing Guidelines. 67 In the end, Diallo was sentenced to "6 months'
home detention, 3 years' probation and restitution of $2,600."68 The choice
of valuation made a significant effect on the sentencing outcome.
C. Harm to the Fashion Industry and Beyond
The counterfeit market for luxury goods affects more than just bankrolls
of fashion houses. Understanding the extent to which this trade affects the
United States is crucial to an examination of the proper way to punish
offenders. Furthermore, it is important to examine why such trafficking has
continued to grow in popularity. A good grasp of these two areas will
explain the true problem of the counterfeit luxury goods market.
Diallo was investigated and arrested for selling counterfeit Louis Vuitton handbags again at
Peddler's Mall. Id. He also tried to sell these bags for use in "purse parties." Id. at 498-99.
61. Id. at 497.
62. Counterfeit Law Blog: Sentences, http://www.counterfeitlawblog.com/archives/cat-
sentences.html (Aug. 19, 2007).
63. Id.
64. See Tentative Rulings and Findings at 3-4, Diallo, 476 F. Supp. 2d 497 (No. 05-
324).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Joe Pinchot, Salesman Gets Probation for Dealing in Knockoff Items, HERALD (Pa.),
Aug. 17, 2007, available at http://www.sharonherald.com/local/local-story-2291
82218.html.
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Seen by most criminals as a "victimless crime," counterfeiting is a "low-
risk [venture] because the perceived likelihood of being caught and
punished is not very high and because the penalties, if caught, are not too
great, ' 69 and thus the trade continues to grow. Counterfeiting of luxury
goods continues to be linked to numerous illicit activities, including
prostitution, drug trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism.70 The
manufacture of counterfeits in China also relates to human trafficking-
since reports indicate that many of the workers making the goods are
children who were sold into slavery.71 Trafficking of counterfeit luxury
goods weakens intellectual property rights, while increasing levels of
various types of criminal activity.
1. The Numbers Tell All
Counterfeiting is particularly a problem in regard to luxury goods. The
realm of luxury goods opens itself up to counterfeiting because people
crave items that provide them with status. 72 Research is beginning to show
that some of the highest profile counterfeit prosecutions are those that
involve luxury goods.73 With advanced technology, counterfeiters are more
and more able to produce counterfeit items that look like the real thing. 74
Moreover, some luxury brands believe that the ratio of real to fake
handbags has risen to the level of one to one. 75
The magnitude of the problem is shown in the numbers, and it seems that
it will only continue to grow.76  The International Anticounterfeiting
Coalition (IACC) in Washington has examined the growing impact of
counterfeiting worldwide:
In 1982, the International Trade Commission estimated losses from
counterfeiting and piracy at $5.5 billion. In 1988, losses were estimated
at $60 billion. In 1996, damage to the United States economy was
estimated at $200 billion....
69. Peterson, supra note 17, at 471 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 104-177,
at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074).
70. See S. REP. No. 104-177, at 4-6, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074.
71. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 285-86.
72. See generally PAMELA N. DANZIGER, LET THEM EAT CAKE: MARKETING LuxuRY TO
THE MASSES-AS WELL AS THE CLASSES 1-16 (2005); THOMAS, supra note 2, at 269-95.
73. See Amendolara, supra note 23, at 809.
74. See Tina Cassidy, Bagging the Knockoffs: There's Nothing Like the Real Thing,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2002, at Dl. "Many fakes... are getting so good that even
company execs say it takes a forensic scientist to distinguish them from the real McCoy."
Frederik Balfour et al., Fakes! (The Global Counterfeit Business Is Out of Control, Targeting
Everything from Computer Chips to Life-Saving Medicines), Bus. WK., Feb. 7, 2005, at 54,
57.
75. Legal representatives from Kate Spade openly discussed these ratios in 2002. See
Amendolara, supra note 23, at 809.
76. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the "number of seizures of
counterfeit and fake products at [U.S.] borders more than doubled from 2000 to 2004."
Sebastian Wright, The Stop Initiative: Working to Protect Intellectual Property Rights,
INT'L TRADE ASS'N, http://trade.gov/press/publications/newsletters/ita_0406/stopO406.asp
(last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
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The situation is no better outside America's borders .... [T]he trade in
counterfeit goods in just four select industries "reduces EU gross
domestic product by C8 billion per annum and costs 17,000 jobs." On the
global level ...in 1998 ...five to seven percent of world trade is
counterfeit goods, a market worth $350 billion.7 7
The fashion industry sees an immediate threat to its profits and future
success. Some, however, see the rise of counterfeiting as the ultimate
compliment; openly finding counterfeiting "'fantastic,"' designer Marc
Jacobs has noted that "as long as I've been here, everything that we have
done has been copied ... We hope to create a product that is desirable."' 78
Although some designers, like Marc Jacobs, love the compliments, design
houses internationally have had to take on extensive legal departments
solely to deal with intellectual property violations. 79 Hoping to help end the
problem, many luxury brands are highlighting the connection between
counterfeit producers and terrorism.80
Counterfeit luxury goods are clearly hurting not only the fashion industry
but also local and national governments. American intellectual property has
a significant impact on the nation's economy: "copyrighted products alone
total over $100 billion annually. In 2002, the United States earned more
than $44 billion in royalties and license fees overseas, higher than any other
country in the world." 81 In New York City alone, the United States is
estimated to lose over $1 billion in tax revenue annually.82 New York State
is estimated to see $34.4 billion spent on purchasing counterfeit goods.83
The IACC, which looks to New York City to explain the impact on the
economy by counterfeiting, stated, "New York City alone loses over $400
77. INT'L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COAL., WHITE PAPER: THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT: ECONOMIC HARM, THREATS TO THE PUBLIC
HEALTH AND SAFETY, AND LINKS TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 3-5
(2005) [hereinafter INT'L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COAL. WHITE PAPER] (citations omitted).
78. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 276 (alteration in original).
79. Id. at 276-77. "Louis Vuitton, one of the world's most copied brands, has forty
lawyers in-house and 250 outside private investigators... and spends approximately...
($18.1 million) each year fighting counterfeiting ... " Id.
80. The law firm of Davenport Lyons commissioned a recent report that found that,
Brand owners must pull together as a collective wherever possible and hammer
home this simple message:
By buying fakes, you are funding organi[z]ed crime-including terrorism.
Clearly, for that message to be effective it must be backed up with specific
evidence. At the moment, the evidence to support this message is rather murky-
it needs drawing out in unambiguous terms.
DAVENPORT LYONS, COUNTERFEITING LUXURY: EXPOSING THE MYTHS 22 (2d ed. 2007).
81. INT'L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COAL. WHITE PAPER, supra note 77, at 6 (citations
omitted).
82. WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, CITY OF N.Y., BOOTLEG
BILLIONS: THE IMPACT OF THE COUNTERFEIT GOODS TRADE ON NEW YORK CITY 1 (2004)
[hereinafter BOOTLEG BILLIONS].
83. Id. at 4 (showing a summary table of counterfeit trade in the United States, New
York State, and New York City in 2003).
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million a year in lost sales and excise taxes due to the sale of counterfeit
goods." 84 That number continues to expand if you look to the national level
($286.8 billion) and worldwide ($456 billion).8 5
Numbers also help illustrate the policy determination by Congress to
fight counterfeits and protect intellectual property rights domestically and
abroad. The Foreign Operations Bill for 2004 was amended to include $2.5
million for the U.S. Department of State to establish programs to aid
developing nations in protecting intellectual property rights.86 Not only has
it been established that counterfeiting affects international trade, but the
numbers keep showing how it hurts individual trademark and copyright
owners. According to the International Trademark Association, trademark
holders worldwide lost "$2 billion in 1995[] as a result of trademark
infringement and counterfeiting. ' 87
2. A Danger-Free Crime?
The lure of the counterfeiting market continues to grow in the United
States for many reasons that include "the increasing recognition and
popularity of certain trademarked goods, [and the fact that] unscrupulous
companies found it easier to market counterfeit goods than to market their
own goods under less well-known trademarks." 88 In terms of counterfeit
luxury goods, many believe that our society's acceptance of them is what
has helped the industry flourish and not die.89 The counterfeit luxury goods
market has the unique element of being a "high-return, low-risk
business." 90 Andrew Oberfeldt, a New York security expert, explained the
low-risk element of the business:
"If I brought in $18,000 worth of handbags in from China"--which would
retail for at least 10 times more---"you'd put me in jail overnight, maybe.
And I'd call my lawyer and be out in the morning. Ninety-nine percent of
the people caught in New York [S]tate selling counterfeit goods do not go
to jail. The judges do not have the laws to sentence. The highest-level
84. Testimony of David C. Quam, Gen. Counsel, Int'l Anticounterfeiting Coal., Inc.,
Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Mar. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Quam Testimony].
Vermont is also feeling the effects of counterfeiting: "the State lost $15.3 million in retail
sales of software alone in 2002, which translated into 267 fewer jobs and $3.6 million in lost
tax revenue. And that is just from computer software." Counterfeiting and Theft of Tangible
Intellectual Property: Challenges and Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Leahy] (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Ranking Democratic Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200403/032304c.html.
85. See BOOTLEG BILLIONS, supra note 82, at 4.
86. Statement of Sen. Leahy, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. LALONDE, supra note 26, at 135.
89. See Amendolara, supra note 23, at 809-10; see also TiM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE
DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 43-52 (2005) (discussing the popularity of luxury
bags and counterfeit goods after the success of the television show Sex and the City,
resulting in a wave of purse parties where no one feels as if counterfeiting is a crime).
90. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 292.
1160 [Vol. 77
2008] COUNTERFEIT LUXURY GOODS TRAFFICKERS
crime to be charged with in New York State is trademark counterfeiting,
which is a C felony, like stealing a nice car .... If you sell ... heroin...
you'll have the DEA, the FBI, New York State and city police, Customs,
and the IRS all looking for you-and you'll go to jail forever. If I sell
counterfeit goods, all those people except the DEA could chase after me,
but can't do anything once they get me. So most don't get involved."9 1
Added to the virtually riskless aspect of counterfeiting, the lack of fear by
the public increases the problems facing deterrence and punishment of
counterfeiting. 92
There is speculation that this is changing as the public is finally
beginning to see the potential threat.93 While the attention has primarily
been on counterfeits that on their face affected the public health, 94 the shift
toward a spotlight on counterfeit goods has also begun. As the ties between
organized crime, terrorism and counterfeit goods come to the forefront, so
too does the need to fight back.95  In 1997, a former leader of the
Vietnamese gang "Born to Kill," based in New York, was jailed for murder
and was also linked to profiting over $13 million from counterfeit
watches. 96 New York City's Chinatown, particularly Canal Street, are now
said to be run by the Fukienese gang, who, although possessing a tight
network, are known for keeping things rather tame.97 Although it appears
to be a rather tame business, the reign of these gangs have been established
through violence. According to U.S. Attorney David N. Kelley,
the gangs 'achieved their dominance through unflinching use of violence
and fear.' During their reign, a man who was suspected of cooperating
with police received 'a beating with pipes until his bones snapped'. . . A
rival gang member was shot in the head and survived only because the
bullet miraculously shattered against his skull[].98
91. Id. at 292-93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. See Katherine Bruce, Riskless Crime?, FORBES, Aug. 11, 1997, at 100.
93. "Last year bogus baby formula was seized in 16 states after several kids suffered
convulsions. There have also been cases involving fake ulcer medication and birth control
pills, not to mention counterfeit parts for cars, airplanes and nuclear plants." Id. at 100-01.
94. See generally JANICE H. NICKEL & HENRY SANG JR., HEWLETm-PACKARD DEV. CO.,
L.P., THE COST OF COUNTERFEITS (2007) (discussing the impact of counterfeit goods-
including a large discussion on counterfeit wine-on global economic health).
95. See DAVID M. HOPKINS, LEWIS T. KONTINIK & MARK T. TURNAGE, COUNTERFEITING
EXPOSED: PROTECTING YOUR BRAND AND CUSTOMERS 175-84 (2003) (discussing the
involvement of organized crime and terrorists in the business of counterfeiting as well as
describing ways businesses can protect their brands).
96. Id. at 176; see also, THOMAS, supra note 2, at 293 (discussing the "Born to Kill"
gang and New York's inability to stop its counterfeiting reign).
97. See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 293-94 ("During a two-day sweep in November 2004,
New York police arrested fifty-one members of two violent gangs and charged them with a
host of crimes ranging from racketeering to trafficking in counterfeit goods. Police
seized... $4 million in counterfeit merchandise carrying the names of Chanel, Gucci, and
Coach.").
98. Id. at 294 (quoting U.S. Attorney David N. Kelley).
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Recognition of the connection between counterfeiters and organized crime
has begun to play a role in the work of the Sentencing Commission. 99
The link between counterfeit goods and terrorism has helped to bring
public attention to the potential dangers of counterfeiting. The Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings in
May 2005 to discuss the link between trafficking of counterfeit goods in the
United States and criminal activities and terrorism.100 The primary focus
was the link between the counterfeit items and activities by the terrorist
group Hezbollah. 01 Senator Susan M. Collins of Maine urged the public to
reassess the importance of ending its participation in counterfeiting:
"People think that when they buy a fake designer bag.. . that they're
just getting a good deal and having some harmless fun. But the reality is
that buying these goods not only supports criminals, but also possibly
terrorists. People need to realize that they could be helping to fund a
terrorist group like Hezbollah, which has attacked and is known to be
planning attacks on Americans .... The production, sale, and purchase
of counterfeit goods is not a victimless crime." 10 2
Recognition of the link between counterfeiting and terrorism is not confined
merely to the United States. Magnus Ranstrop, the former director of the
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University
of St. Andrews in Scotland, has researched the situation to conclude that
"[p]rofits from counterfeiting are one of the three main sources of income
supporting international terrorism." 10 3
Policy has dictated that ending trafficking of counterfeit luxury goods is a
priority. Understanding the seriousness and depth of the problem has led to
the changes seen in the Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines have
changed in the area of valuation as the Sentencing Commission has
continued to struggle with the proper remedy and punishment for
trafficking in counterfeits. The intricacies of the role luxury goods play in
society combined with the growing strength of the counterfeit trade world
enables an examination of the proper tools necessary to fight this battle.
99. The International Anticounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission were extremely aware of the "role of organized crime in counterfeiting and
piracy" in designing the 2000 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. Quam Testimony,
supra note 84.
100. See Press Release, Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
Senator Collins Chairs Hearing Detailing Link Between Sale of Counterfeit Goods and
Hezbollah (May 25 2005), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfin?Fuse
Action=PressReleases.Detail&PressReleaseid=i 387f35f-9cdd-49e0-bb 15-6dd34ddfd881 &
Affiliation=R.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Sen. Susan Collins).
103. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 276.
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II. THE VALUATION BATTLE BETWEEN THE CURRENT USE OF STREET
VALUE VERSUS THE SUGGESTED USE OF RETAIL VALUE
The Sentencing Guidelines currently hold a presumption toward the use
of street value in determining sentences. Part II of this Note examines this
current valuation scheme and its justifications. In addition, this part looks
to a growing opposition to the Guidelines and the justifications behind the
proposed change to the use of retail value. Finally, this part addresses the
growing valuation debate that has occurred and how the different values
affect the policy decision to end trafficking of luxury counterfeit goods.
A. Arguments in Favor of Using Street Value in the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
The Sentencing Guidelines were amended after the passage of the NET
Act.104 The justifications behind passage of the NET Act have been used
by the Sentencing Commission in their choice of relying on street value. 10 5
Scholars have relied on various theories, particularly the Incentive Theory
and the Piracy Paradox to defend the current valuation in the Guidelines.] 06
Many argue that the current Guidelines, coupled with recent case law, are
creating results that fulfill the goals of the amended Guidelines. 107
1. The Aftermath of the No Electronic Theft Act
Looking to the background of the 2000 amendments to section 2B5.3 of
the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission explains why the
monetary calculations formula was changed. Much of the changes were in
response to the NET Act directive. 10 8 Congress passed the NET Act in
1998 to amend the penalties for criminal infringement of a copyright.' 0 9 A
crucial aspect of this valuation decision is how the NET Act chose to deal
with the trafficking in counterfeit goods or services.110 The Sentencing
Commission specifically addressed their decision in the 2000 amendments:
"the Commission determined that defendants who engage in such conduct
are more culpable than other intellectual property offenders because they
place infringing items into the stream of commerce, thereby enabling others
to infringe the copyright or trademark."I'I
The discussion of the proper valuation was central to the Intellectual
Property Amendments of 2000 and 2006 to the Sentencing Guidelines. 112
104. See No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (codified in
scattered sections of 17 and 18 U.S.C.).
105. POLIcY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 4-5.
106. See infra Part II.A.3.
107. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
108. POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 4-5.
109. See No Electronic Theft Act, 111 Stat. at 2678.
110. See id.
111. See POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
112. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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In determining the proper valuation, the Sentencing Commission sought to
achieve the calculation that provided "a reasonable estimate of the resulting
harm."' 13 The Commission believed that using street value would be the
best way to estimate the harm caused by the counterfeiting. 114 In response
to the enactment of the NET Act, the Commission had difficulty with the
question of valuation and found that proportionality was the best solution:
"IT]he sale of obviously counterfeit purses at deep discounts at a flea
market and the illegal uploading to an Internet site of high quality, pirated
software that results in the infringed software being made widely available
at no cost cause very different types and magnitudes of harm." 115 This
exemplifies the need to reexamine the valuation used in the Sentencing
Guidelines.
However, the Commission did recognize that there may be situations
where for "reasons of practicality" application of retail value should be
penrnitted. 116 In recognizing the need for this caveat, the Commission
looked to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. Larracuente, and discussed the court's finding that use of
the retail value of the tapes copied was the "appropriate value for use to
compute the infringement amount where the unauthorized copies were of
sufficient quality to permit their distribution through normal retail
outlets." 117  This instance is the exception rather than the rule. The
Commission decided that under the guide of fairness, the proper valuation
should be street value. If the formula was to be primarily based on retail
value then it "would overstate substantially the pecuniary harm caused to
copyright and trademark owners." 18
Furthermore, the Sentencing Commission in its 2006 Policy
Development Report addressed the need to look to both the NET Act and
the Booker decision in developing its current set of amendments. 119 In
looking at the impact of Booker, the Policy Development Team looked into
all cases from fiscal year 2003 that had been sentenced under section 2B5.3
and all cases sentenced under that guideline in the first six months after
Booker in 2005.120 The Policy Development Team found eighty-six cases
sentenced under section 2B5.3 in 2003.121 Of those eighty-six cases,
approximately 20.9% involved trademarked goods, such as watches and
113. POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
114. "The Commission believed that use of that calculation would provide a reasonable
approximation for those classes of infringement cases in which it is highly likely that the sale
of an infringing item results in a displaced sale of the legitimate, infringed item." Id.
115. Timothy McGrath, Interim Staff Dir., U.S. Sentencing Comm., Testimony Before
the Courts and Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee 3
(May 12, 1999) [hereinafter McGrath Testimony].
116. See POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
117. Id. at 5 n.7; see United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1992).
118. POLIcY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
119. See id. at 6.
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id.
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handbags. 122 The analysis of these eighty-six cases' sentencing under the
Sentencing Guidelines led the Team to believe that courts apply specific
offense characteristics when appropriate. 123
The findings of the Policy Development Team in looking to these cases
show the success of the current Guidelines. Not only did they find that
courts were appropriately applying the Guidelines but they also found that
the change in valuation in the Guidelines caused an increase in defendants
being sentenced with prison terms. 124 This increase of sentenced prison
terms 125 was in relation to those individuals who had been sentenced under
the earlier versions of the Guidelines, which had a valuation based on retail
value. 126 When the Policy Development Team looked to the post-Booker
cases, they found similar results. 127 They found that courts were still
applying the Guidelines "when appropriate."' 128 Notably, the Team found
that "an even greater percentage of defendants sentenced under [section]
2B5.3 in the post-Booker era received a prison term than those sentenced in
FY 03."129
2. The Use of "Street Value" Provides for the Most Equitable Results
It appears that the Guidelines are working as hoped. The intent of the
Commission was to amend the Guidelines to allow for the most equitable
results.130 Cases dealing with counterfeit luxury goods have shown that the
courts have easily handled the Guidelines and continued to support them.131
Courts have concluded that there is an importance of using street value:
So the point is not one of real value.. . as much as it is a look to see what
the mark is worth when it's placed on an item that might be totally
worthless .... [S]omething worthless becomes worth something at the
point that the reputation of someone else is attached to it.132
Moreover, courts have been able to apply full retail value when they have
found it necessary to do so.133 In United States v. Alim,1 34 Husain Abdul
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. "The Team's empirical analysis also revealed that an increased number of
defendants sentenced under this section received a prison term. Fifty (50) percent received
prison terms with a median term of 18 months imposed." Id. (footnotes omitted).
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 8.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 4-5.
131. For example, in United States v. Yi, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
vacated the defendant's sentence because the lower court failed to properly utilize the
Sentencing Guidelines. 451 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2006). This case did not deal with counterfeit
luxury goods, rather it dealt with counterfeit batteries, extension cords, and toys.
132. Id. at 374 (alterations in original) (quoting the district court opinion).
133. See United States v. Alim, No. 06-15987, 2007 WL 2551564, at *4 (11th Cir. Sept.
7, 2007) (quoting the district court and applying the retail value standard because the
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Alim owned a store where he sold thousands of counterfeit luxury goods
bearing the trademarks of Lacoste, Louis Vuitton, Burberry, and many
others. 135 Alim received prison time and a fine of $25,000. U.S. Attorney
Alice H. Martin explained, "The prison term reflects that counterfeiting is a
serious crime which carries a stiff penalty."' 136
Defining valuation as "street value" and keeping the current Guidelines
falls in line with arguments posed by many intellectual property scholars.
Professor Mark A. Lemley of Stanford Law School points out that the
"absolute protection or full-value view draws significant intellectual
support from the idea that intellectual property is simply a species of real
property rather than a unique form of legal protection designed to deal with
public goods problems."'137 Lemley disagrees with allowing the law of
intellectual property to mirror the law of property, believing that it is
fundamentally misguided and does not follow our legal regulations of other
sectors of the economy. 138 Much of his belief regarding the proper
penalties falls in line with the incentive-based element-that individuals
believe ownership of a luxury will denote status-of luxury goods. Lemley
explains that in the economy and the world of producers, as long as a price
stays above "marginal cost producers will still make the good[s]. ' ' 139 In the
world of intellectual property, Lemley explains how the courts have defined
the elements of the "quasi-intellectual property tort of misappropriation by
reference to whether the defendant is free riding on the plaintiffs
information." 140
evidence at trial showed that the counterfeit goods would "appear to a reasonably informed
purchaser to be substantially equivalent to the genuine versions of the items").
134. Id. at *2.
135. See Press Release, Alice H. Martin, U.S. Attorney for the N. Dist. of Ala., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Tuscaloosa Merchant Sentenced (Nov. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/aln/Docs/November%202006/November%209,%202006%20TU
SCALOOSA%20MERCHANT%20SENTENCED.html.
136. Id.
137. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1031-32 (2005). In this particular article, Mark A. Lemley argues that
full internalization of positive externalities is not a proper goal of tangible property
rights except in unusual circumstances, for several reasons: (1) there is no need to
fully internalize benefits in intellectual property; (2) efforts to capture positive
externalities may actually reduce them, leaving everyone worse off; and (3) the
effort to capture such externalities invites rent-seeking.
Id. at 1032.
138. Lemley explains that,
In no other area of the economy do we permit the full internalization of social
benefits. Competitive markets work not because producers capture the full social
value of their output--they do not, except at the margin-but because they permit
producers to make enough money to cover their costs, including a reasonable
return on fixed-cost investment.
Id. at 1032.
139. Id. at 1047.
140. Id. at 1043; see NBA v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing
how free riding reduces the incentive to produce new products). In defining what constitutes
a "hot news" claim, the Court discussed the necessity of five elements, including whether
"the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so
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To understand the application of free-riding to trademark law it is
important to understand the remedy of disgorgement, which is the principle
that "[a]nyone who benefits from the use of the intellectual property right
must forfeit the benefit to the intellectual property owner." 141  Lemley
continues to argue that "increases in intellectual property protection that
restrict more innovation than they encourage cannot be economically
justified."'142 Ultimately, Lemley proposes that we abandon the analogies
often made to real property and allow intellectual property to grow on its
own. 143  The needs of intellectual property are unique; therefore the
application of remedies must not be based on an analogy to tangible real
property. 144
3. The Incentive Theory and the Use of Street Value
Remaining with the current standards set forth by the Sentencing
Guidelines recognizes the role of the "incentive theory" in dealing with the
luxury goods industry. 145 For the incentive theory to apply to intellectual
property, Jonathan M. Barnett argues that it is subject to two conditions:
"(1) there actually exist few or no effective extralegal means for preventing
or delaying imitation, and (2) intellectual property rights are effective at
thwarting imitators." 146 Critics of the Sentencing Guidelines argue that the
Guidelines must be cognizant of the incentive theory and recommend that
the Guidelines be amended to contain tougher penalties to overcome this
phenomenon. 147 Barnett argues the contrary, that the incentive thesis
depends on the factual assumption that "third-party imitators necessarily
take away sales that would have been captured by the innovator" 148 and that
the thesis might not apply because producers benefit from the existence of
counterfeits in the market: 149
reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be
substantially threatened." Id. at 845.
141. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1045-46.
142. Id. at 1068. Lemley uses the example of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, "which provided no new incentive to authors and complicated efforts to make use of a
large number of existing works." Id.
143. See id. at 1073-75.
144. See id. at 1075.
145. "The standard incentive argument would anticipate that such widespread
counterfeiting, and the relative paucity of effective legal deterrents, should limit legitimate
producers' ability to fully appropriate investment proceeds and therefore significantly reduce
their incentive to develop new products." Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal
Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis,
91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2005).
146. Id. at 1382; see also Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1269-80 (2004) (discussing the incentive-based justifications in
the context of patents).
147. See infra Part I.B.
148. Barnett, supra note 145, at 1382.
149. See Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, 340 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(discussing an expert report prepared for Louis Vuitton that found consumer awareness of
fake Louis Vuitton bags actually made the real bags more desirable); see also Barnett, supra
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This unusual result may arise when three conditions are met: (1) the
relevant market consists of goods that confer significant status benefits,
(2) imitators generally produce imitations of the original that are
obviously imperfect, and (3) the legitimate producer cannot introduce
imperfect grades of the original without significantly depleting its
accumulated brand capital. 150
In fact, Barnett believes that prosecution of counterfeiting needs to be less
stringent, because the "[p]rosecution of counterfeiting may reduce socially
excessive consumption by increasing the cost of acquiring counterfeit
fashion goods, thereby having the counterintuitive effect of advancing
social welfare generally while (to the extent counterfeiting boosts revenues
earned on sales of the original) reducing the welfare of fashion-goods
producers in particular."' 51
Barnett believes that maintaining the status quo for enforcement and
punishment of counterfeiters "may be the best of all possible worlds for the
legitimate producer."' 152 Barnett points out that the luxury goods industry
provides various conditions that could make it possible for legitimate
producers to profit from counterfeiting. 153  "If imperfect counterfeits
increase total expected revenues on sales of the original, then, from the
perspective of the legitimate producer, the desired level of unauthorized
imitation is likely to be greater than zero, irrespective of enforcement
costs." 154 Barnett even takes it one step further, believing that it is possible
that the fashion industry does not need anticounterfeiting protection.155 To
Barnett, anticounterfeiting laws create a scenario where, instead of
protecting, they actually detract from intellectual property protections.
What we may be seeing in the context of counterfeit luxury goods is
Barnett's reverse incentive theory, that "access to the lower-quality version
makes buyers all the more interested in eventually getting the real stuff."'1 56
Barnett's theory suggests that these counterfeit items may not be causing
substantial harm to the fashion industry. His theory would hold that instead
of diluting the value of a designer's trademark or taking away from the
profits of the particular luxury handbag, the existence of the counterfeit may
note 145, at 1399-401 (discussing the effects of counterfeit goods on various luxury brands
such as Giorgio Armani, Louis Vuitton, and Gucci).
150. Barnett, supra note 145, at 1382-83.
151. Id. at 1385.
152. Id. at 1412.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 1413.
155. "[A]nti-counterfeiting laws are at best unnecessary in the fashion-goods industry
with respect to imperfect counterfeiting since ... legitimate producers are expected to forego
vigorous enforcement of their rights under these laws." Id. at 1416.
156. James Surowiecki, The Piracy Paradox, NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 2007, at 90; see
also Barnett, supra note 145, at 1411 (proclaiming "aspirational utility" and discussing
incentive-based justifications for intellectual property rights).
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in fact be spreading the brand name and increasing desires to obtain the
"actual label."' 157
B. Arguments in Favor of Using Retail Value in the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Although the Commission has chosen to take a stronger stance against
counterfeit goods, some commentators argue that the Sentencing Guidelines
and how the courts are using them are not achieving the stated goals. These
commentators point to congressional policy decisions and urge amending
the Sentencing Guidelines to either define valuation as retail value
presumptively or to create more categories to permit this upward departure.
In analyzing whether the Sentencing Guidelines should be amended to
determine the infringement amount based on the full retail value, it is
imperative to look to the current framework. The current Sentencing
Guidelines do have provisions that allow for the use of retail value in
calculating the infringement amount. 158 However, recent counterfeiting
cases show the difficulty courts have had with fitting cases into these
categories, and thus street value is routinely used.' 59 Many scholars and
organizations that are well-versed in the area of intellectual property rights
urge the Sentencing Commission to refine the Guidelines to result in
harsher penalties. 160  The foundation of these arguments is that the
Sentencing Guidelines no longer make sense, because hardly any cases
qualify for application of retail value, and no longer address the plague of
counterfeit luxury goods.
1. Judicial Misapplication of the Guidelines?
Since the Booker decision in 2005, the Sentencing Guidelines are no
longer mandatory; instead, they are just supposed to be one factor that
judges use in determining sentencing. 161  However, it is becoming
157. Although designers like Marc Jacobs have spoken out in support of counterfeits,
design houses employ large legal departments for the sole purpose of dealing with
intellectual property violations. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 290-95 (discussing various design
houses' efforts to crack down on counterfeiters).
158. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3 cmt. n.2(A) (2006).
159. See United States v. Alim, No. 06-15987, 2007 WL 2551564, at *4 n.4 (11th Cir.
Sept. 7, 2007) ("We also reject Alim's argument that the district court failed to articulate its
reasoning for using the retail value of the infringed items to calculate his offense level. The
district court listened to the parties' arguments and testimony on the matter, and then
expressly adopted the factual findings of the PSI, which noted, among other things, that the
counterfeit items [were] substantially equivalent to the actual items ...." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Yi, 451 F.3d 362, 373 (5th Cir. 2006); see also supra text
accompanying note 132.
160. See Peterson, supra note 17, at 461 ("Civil penalties alone will not deter violators
trafficking in counterfeit component parts."); John S. Bliss, President, Int'l
Anticounterfeiting Coal., Testimony Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Mar. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Bliss Testimony]; Quam Testimony, supra note 84.
161. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text; see also Counterfeit Law Blog:
Sentences, http://www.counterfeitlawblog.com/archives/cat-sentences.html (Aug. 1, 2006)
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increasingly evident that courts are not using them as a guide, but rather as
the only factor. 162 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced
this predicament in United States v. Huang.163 The Ninth Circuit reversed
Frank Fu Jen Huang's sentence of "six months [of] home confinement, five
years of probation, and 2,500 hours of community service."1 64 The Ninth
Circuit criticized the district court for failing to "calculate a Guidelines-
range sentence and failure to provide a clear statement of reasons for
imposing the sentence it chose."' 165 The question raised is whether the
Guidelines are becoming more mandatory than the Booker Court
intended. 166
The Sentencing Guidelines only permit application of retail value when
the incident falls within one of a few specifically enumerated categories. 167
Although courts have, on occasion, been able to utilize these categories, 168
some courts are finding it extremely difficult to do SO.169 In particular,
courts of appeals find themselves in a hard place when reviewing district
court decisions: "Ultimately, this court is left with a situation in which the
district court found that the retail value. . . provided a more accurate
assessment of the pecuniary harm to the trademark owners, but apparently
did not base its finding on any facts in the record."' 170 As in United States v.
Yi, courts are pressured to vacate sentences when they find that a court did
not rely fully on the categories of the Sentencing Guidelines but relied on
the belief that retail value was the best assessment of the pecuniary harm. 171
Commentators fear that judges are giving lenient sentences because their
hands are tied by the current set of Sentencing Guidelines.
Judicial application of the Sentencing Guidelines seems to be in conflict
with the government's policy of cracking down on counterfeiters. The
("Since the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Booker, district courts have the discretion to
sentence individuals outside the sentencing ranges established in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, but they still must take the applicable Guidelines range into consideration during
sentencing.").
162. See infra notes 168-71.
163. No. 05-50455, 2006 WL 1345541 (9th Cir. May 17, 2006).
164. See Counterfeit Law Blog: Sentences, http://www.counterfeitlawblog.com/archives/
cat-sentences.html (Aug. 1, 2006).
165. Id.
166. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
168. See United States v. Alim, No. 06-15987, 2007 WL 2551564 (9th Cir. May 17,
2006) ("Because this testimony supports the district court's factual finding that the
counterfeit items would appear to a reasonably informed purchaser to be substantially
equivalent to the genuine versions of the items, the district court was instructed by the
Guidelines to use the retail value of the infringed items."); see also supra notes 133-36 and
accompanying text.
169. See United States v. Yi, 451 F.3d 362, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing how the
Sentencing Guidelines lay out particular categories that must be fulfilled to apply retail value
and noting that it is almost impossible for courts to fulfill those requirements).
170. Id. at 375.
171. See, e.g., id. at 375-76.
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Diallo case illustrates this conflict. 172  Although Diallo was a repeat
counterfeit offender, and was found with boxes of counterfeits bearing the
trademarks of Louis Vuitton, Prada, Coach, Kate Spade, Burberry, and
Chanel, the court still simply applied street value in determining his
sentence. 173 The judge determining sentencing in the Diallo case believed
"that the value of a genuine item does not provide an accurate assessment of
the harm to a trademark or copyright caused by counterfeiting, reflecting a
fairly sanguine view of the harms caused to brand-owners by
counterfeiting."1 74
In response to the growing problem, some judges are actually handing
down stiffer penalties. 175 For instance, federal judges in south Florida have
begun to give strong sentences. Judge Jose E. Martinez in August 2006
sentenced Ji Wu Chen and his coconspirator to ninety-seven months and
eighty-seven months, respectively, for trafficking in counterfeit luxury
goods. 176 In April 2007, a Massachusetts federal judge seemed to be
willing to do the same when he sentenced four individuals to almost three
years imprisonment for trafficking in counterfeit luxury handbags worth, at
street value, more than $1 million. 177 Though these trendsetters exist, the
general trend in counterfeit luxury goods cases has been to impose
sentences similar to that in Diallo.
2. Using Retail Value to Measure Harm
The Sentencing Commission, in their 2000 Amendments believed that
using street value was the best way to calculate harm. 178 However, many
scholars and organizations argue that the best measure of injury is found
when using retail value. 179 Those in favor of retail value argue that this
valuation is the only way to meet congressional goals and measure the harm
to the intellectual property owner.
Lenient sentences demand an evaluation of the Sentencing Guidelines to
determine whether or not street value is an adequate valuation in fighting
counterfeits. Prior to passage of the NET Act, Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy
172. See Counterfeit Law Blog: Sentences, http://www.counterfeitlawblog.com/archives/
cat-sentences.html (Aug. 19, 2007); see also United States v. Diallo, 476 F. Supp. 2d 497
(W.D. Pa. 2007).
173. Id.; see also supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 172.
175. See Leora Herrmann, Counterfeit Crackdown, WORLD CITY MAG.,
http://www.worldcityweb.comihome/MIA/publications/magazine/14/520/ (last visited Nov.
10, 2008).
176. See Counterfeit Law Blog: Sentences, http://www.counterfeitlawblog.com/archives/
cat-sentences.html (Aug. 25, 2006); see also United States v. Chen, 273 F. App'x 838 (1 1th
Cir. 2008) (discussing and affirming Chen's sentence); U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, ICE Fact Sheet: Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Investigations (July 1,
2008), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/iproverview.htm.
177. See Counterfeit Law Blog: Sentences, http://www.counterfeitlawblog.com/archives/
cat-sentences.html (Apr. 9, 2007).
178. See POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
179. See infra notes 197-202.
1171
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
(DOJ), testified before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary to discuss the
Guidelines' flawed reliance on the street value of an item rather than the
retail value:
[Section 2B5.3's] exclusive focus on the low retail value of the infringing
goods, without regard to the actual value of the legitimate goods, has led
courts to impose lower sentences on defendants who commit intellectual
property crimes than those who commit other types of fraud. The low
sentences lead to a reluctance on the part of law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors to commit scarce resources to investigating and prosecuting
these cases. 180
After passage of the NET Act, the Sentencing Commission put out a
general request for comment on how to include the NET Act in the
Sentencing Guidelines. 181  The DOJ responded with a suggestion to
implement more stringent provisions for copyright infringement. 182 The
DOJ found there to be a "crisis of non-prosecution due to inadequate
sentencing."' 183 Congressmen Bob Goodlatte and Howard Coble wrote to
the Sentencing Commission regarding their views of the NET Act, "the
purpose of the [NET Act] directive was to... increase the potential
criminal liability of infringers because it is the view of Congress that the
current standard fails to offer an appropriate and effective level of
deterrence."' 184 Joseph F. Savage and Kristina E. Barclay call to attention
the language ultimately adopted by the Sentencing Commission in its 2000
Amendments. They argue that the choice of the Commission to use "retail
value of infringing items" makes no distinction from the potential use of
"retail price."185 These scholars believe that the 2000 Amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines are flawed because of their choice of valuation.
Choosing street value, to Savage and Barclay, "ignores the fact that the
entire retail value of the infringed-upon item is not won by the criminal...
infringer (in fact, most of the time the infringer wins nothing at all).' 186
The amended section 2B5.3, to these authors, has lost its focus of
determining the actual loss to the intellectual property owner and, in fact,
180. Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Kristina E. Barclay, When the Heartland Is "Outside the
Heartland: " The New Guidelines for Net Act Sentencing, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 373, 378
(2000) (citing Implementation of the 'NET' Act and Enforcement Against Internet Piracy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 8-11 (1999) (Statement of Rep. Howard Coble, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, H. Comm. on the Judiciary)).
181. Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements and
Commentary, 63 Fed. Reg. 602 (Proposed Jan. 6, 1998), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/fedreg/fedr0 1 98.htm.
182. See Savage & Barclay, supra note 180, at 378.
183. Id. at 382.
184. Id. at 383 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3 app. E, at 1
(2006)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 388.
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his or her loss now is irrelevant "due to the reality-particularly in Internet
piracy cases--that such loss would be virtually impossible to establish."' 187
The misplaced view of what harm is caused to the intellectual property
owner is signaled by the use of retail value in the amended Guidelines.188
The IACC continues to urge the Sentencing Commission to reevaluate
the Guidelines, drawing attention to the tension between congressional
intent to end counterfeiting and the leniency of the Sentencing
Guidelines. 189 In his 1998 testimony before the Sentencing Commission,
John S. Bliss, president of the IACC, urged an increase in factors when
calculating losses:
"[I]t is very difficult to calculate damages to a trademark holder from
counterfeiting .... In the criminal context, courts should consider all
aspects of the crime, the value of the legitimate goods, the value of the
fakes, harm to reputation, dilution of the trademark, and other market
forces when evaluating the amount of losses."']90
Bliss attempted to bring the Commission's attention to the fact that
Congress intended to stop counterfeiting as evidenced by the passage of the
Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (ACPA), which
increased the priority of intellectual property crimes.191 In response to both
the ACPA and the NET Act, Bliss urged the Commission to fall in line with
international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) by
increasing imprisonment and monetary fines in order to deter
counterfeiting. 192 At the heart of his testimony was the clear conflict
between the Sentencing Guidelines and policy decisions to end the trade of
counterfeiting. 93 Bliss proposed a list of suggestions on how best to
prevent continued counterfeiting.194
This conflict still exists today. The IACC complained of the ineffective
nature of the Sentencing Guidelines again in 2000.195 Looking to the
guidelines that dealt with the offenses of counterfeiting, 196 it argued that
"the high monetary thresholds required to impose meaningful sentences"
187. Id. at 389.
188. Id.
189. The IACC is a nonprofit trade association dedicated to the protection of intellectual
property rights. See generally The International Anticounterfeiting Coalition,
http://www.iacc.org/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
190. Bliss Testimony, supra note 160, at 6-7.
191. Id. at 3-4.
192. Id. at 4.
193. Id. at 4-5 ("It is important to note that in its directive to the Commission, Congress
did not make corresponding changes to USC 2320, the underlying statute governing
trademark counterfeiting. One explanation for Congress's omission is that it believes that
existing penalties under the statute are stringent enough to provide a deterrent, if enforced.").
194. Among the recommendations that the IACC presented to the commission were: (1)
to increase the link between counterfeiting and theft, and (2) require a minimum penalty of
"one year imprisonment for most counterfeiters." Id. at 6-7.
195. See generally Quam Testimony, supra note 84.
196. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-2320 (2006).
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prevented the possible sentences from being an effective deterrent. 197 Once
again, the IACC urged changes in the Sentencing Guidelines in order to
help the United States in its efforts to increase global intellectual property
protection.198 Strongly put, the "[s]entencing guidelines that fail to provide
strong penalties under U.S. law will undermine the [g]overnment's efforts
abroad and provide trading partners with a basis to argue that the United
States itself lacks the political will to impose strict penalties."' 199 During its
2000 testimony, the IACC provided various recommendations to the
Sentencing Commission, primarily based on returning the baseline
valuation to retail value instead of street value.200 The IACC looked to the
four alternative proposals that the Sentencing Commission had in mind for
section 2B5.3.201 The IACC found particularly persuasive the idea of
returning the valuation back to retail value.202
Critics of the current Sentencing Guidelines emphasize two major points:
(1) courts are using the Guidelines as more than just a factor in determining
sentencing, and (2) that the current scheme does not work to deter
counterfeiters. 20 3 Debra D. Peterson reminds that the "[m]onetary penalties
for counterfeiting are usually minimal, which barely affect the
counterfeiter's operation." 204  Peterson explains that due to the
sophisticated nature of the counterfeit business, "monetary penalties alone"
will not act as a sufficient deterrent.2 05 Congressional intent has been to
"increase penalties and sentencing for intellectual property violations. '206
III. AMENDING THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES TO MORE EASILY PERMIT
APPLICATION OF RETAIL VALUE
In evaluating the two sides of the valuation debate, it is important to
determine which valuation standard would best fulfill policy directives
regarding intellectual property rights and the counterfeit luxury goods trade.
The valuation debate shows that there is a conflict between congressional
intent and judicial action, which commentators argue is the result of the
choice of the street value valuation standard. 207  Because this conflict
197. Quam Testimony, supra note 84, § I(B).
198. Id. The IACC discussed with the Sentencing Commission the use of "domestic trade
law provisions like [19 U.S.C. § 2242] and multilateral tribunals such as the World Trade
Organization... to persuade trading partners to strengthen their national laws to combat and
deter counterfeiting and piracy." Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. § II.
201. Id.
202. Id. § 11(1) ("Reliance upon the actual price of legitimate product, instead of the value
of the [street value], more accurately reflects the injury to the intellectual property rights
holder, and provides greater certainty for both prosecutors and the Courts in applying the
guidelines ... ").
203. See Bliss Testimony, supra note 160; Quam Testimony, supra note 84.
204. Peterson, supra note 17, at 493.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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exists, it is necessary to determine which valuation will best serve the rights
of intellectual property owners. Abandoning the current presumption of
street value and moving toward a system where it is much easier to apply
retail value is the best option currently available. This move will not only
help to strengthen intellectual property rights, but will also help curb
trafficking of counterfeit luxury goods.
In assessing the best way to deal with valuation, it is important to decide
what will best help the crusade against trafficking of counterfeit luxury
goods. The Guidelines should move away from the street value standard in
light of the aftermath of the Booker decision.20 8 Following Booker, a
departure from the street value standard is warranted. Moreover, the
strength of luxury goods in our society has created a need for stronger
sentences in order to disincentivize individuals from trafficking in
counterfeit luxury goods. To this end, it is essential to understand why
ending trafficking in counterfeit luxury goods is important public policy.
An examination of the totality of the circumstances and the use of retail
value as a valuation standard will ultimately solve the problems created by
the trafficking of counterfeit luxury goods.
This part examines why the use of street value is inadequate to address
the problems posed by the counterfeit luxury market. It also discusses how
changing to a system of retail value and looking at the totality of the
circumstances will best fight counterfeiting. Finally, it discusses the
relevant societal implications. Taking these factors into consideration, it is
clearly necessary to move to the use of retail value.
A. The Current Use of Street Value: A Clear Conflict Between
Congressional Intent and Judicial Action
The counterfeit luxury goods trade should continue to be a policy
priority. Research shows the growing ties between counterfeiting and
organized crime.20 9 Trafficking of counterfeit goods has risen above the
level of an economic problem-it now is considered a public health and
safety risk.210  Government reports have exposed links between
counterfeiting and terrorism.211 Congress has signaled the importance of
ending the trade of counterfeit luxury goods by passing numerous laws that
protect trademarks and penalize those who traffic counterfeit goods. 212
Counterfeiting has become more than just an economic problem, and as the
public awareness grows, so does the priority placed on ending
counterfeiting.
In the NET Act, Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to "create
penalties to deter counterfeiting and piracy" in the Commission's 1998
208. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
209. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
212. See supra Part I.A.
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amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. 213  In doing so, Congress
recognized the necessity of"increas[ing] the actual length of sentences. '214
Although Congress holds ending the sale of counterfeit goods as a high
priority by providing stricter penalties and laws, judicial imposition of
sentencing seems to be running against congressional initiatives. The
sentences imposed by many judges seem to provide little deterrence to
counterfeiters. Diallo is a classic example. 215 Diallo was given a lenient
sentence considering it was at least his third offense-all three offenses
involved the selling of numerous counterfeit luxury handbags.216 Although
it was his third offense, he was only sentenced to thirty-three to forty-one
months in prison.217  It seems unlikely that Diallo's past and recent
sentences will deter him from committing the offense again.
This point is absolutely essential in the valuation debate. Cases like
Diallo demonstrate that low sentences, imposed mostly because of the street
value presumption, fail to prevent counterfeiting. Low sentences coupled
with the perception of the victimless nature of the crime need to be
addressed. 218 Moving away from the view that counterfeiting is just a
victimless crime is essential to making progress to end it. Particularly, it is
important to communicate this message to those who would purchase
counterfeits. General public opinion can no longer be that counterfeiting is
a harmless crime.
Most people don't get aroused by the spectacle of poor immigrants selling
tacky handbags and obviously fake Rolexes in flea markets and on
sidewalks. [They do] get aroused by the drug trade and the threat it poses
to public safety. Responding to what the public wants, law enforcement
officials and prosecutors have tended to hit the drug dealers and leave the
counterfeiters of goods pretty much alone.219
However, it is apparent that congressional intent is to inform the public of
this connection to terrorism and to separate counterfeiting from the
victimless crime stereotype. Currently, the public observes traffickers of
counterfeit luxury goods receiving minor punishments-almost no jail
time-which reinforces the view that the crime is harmless. 220 The current
view of counterfeiting as being a harmless crime would be eradicated by the
existence of stiffer penalties.
The Sentencing Guidelines in their current state do not fulfill the goals
Congress has stated regarding trafficking of counterfeit luxury goods. The
Sentencing Commission, when determining how best to measure the
pecuniary harm caused by counterfeits, should take into consideration the
213. See Bliss Testimony, supra note 160, at 4.
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part I.C.2.
219. Bruce, supra note 92, at 100.
220. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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full effect of counterfeit luxury goods on luxury brands. The current
standard makes it extremely difficult to apply retail value, which is the
standard that would lead to harsher punishments. The Sentencing
Guidelines allow for the application of retail value in the case of a
"counterfeit label, patch, sticker, wrapper, badge, emblem, medallion,
charm, box, container, can, case, hangtag, documentation, or packaging" 22'
that has not been attached to the item yet would appear to a "reasonably
informed purchaser" that it could be attached to a noncounterfeit item.222
Although it appears to provide protection for the existence of counterfeit
labels or patches, the Sentencing Guidelines do not have provisions that
would protect the copying of the overall design that might also add to the
confusion of the consumer. For example, a counterfeit Kate Spade
traditional, nylon rectangle-shaped bag might fall in this category if the
trademarked label is present and meets the criteria. However, if the "Kate
Spade" label to be attached to the bag by the counterfeiter is not of a quality
that a "reasonably informed purchaser" would believe that it is the authentic
label, then the bag itself has to be valued at street value. Clearly a
consumer purchasing a Kate Spade bag for twenty dollars on the streets of
Chinatown might suspect that it is a fake because of its price; however, this
is still taking away potential profits. The Sentencing Guidelines do not
necessarily provide for instances like this. Additionally, the Sentencing
Commission should consider altering the category that deals with the
comparison of the two values of the items. The current set of standards that
are found within the comments to the May 2000 amendments are too
stringent and should be broadened so that more items fall within them. The
Sentencing Commission should adopt a standard that would deter
counterfeiters in the future. The best way to provide for such deterrence is
to amend the Sentencing Guidelines to allow additional applications of full
retail value.
With the passage of the NET Act, Congress directed the Sentencing
Commission to refashion the Guidelines to best meet congressional goals of
measuring harm.223 The Commission chose to apply street value because
they felt that proportionality was the answer to the NET Act.224 The
Commission believed that the alternative choice of retail value would
overstate the harm to the intellectual property owners. 225 The harm caused
to the intellectual property owner is a loss of the right to control his or her
intellectual property.226 The current Guidelines provide for low penalties,
which have created a riskless crime and do not prevent the continued harm
to the intellectual property owner.
221. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3(2)(a)(vii) (2006).
222. See id.
223. See supra Part II.A. 1.
224. See McGrath Testimony, supra note 115, at 3.
225. See POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
226. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of
Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 909, 958-59 (2007).
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Most of the sentences imposed over the last few years seem to be the
result of courts' handling of Booker. After the Supreme Court's decision in
Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines were to be just that---guidelines. 227
They were to be a mere factor for courts imposing sentences. The cases
discussed in Part II.B showcase numerous examples where it seems that the
guidelines were not used as just a guide. 228 However, the stringentness of
courts makes it even more important that the Sentencing Guidelines be
changed to allow for more application of retail value. If the goal of the
Sentencing Guidelines is to allow courts to calculate sentences based on the
harm actually caused to the intellectual property right owner, then such
calculations need to actually be done. The stringentness of the courts
makes it apparent that such calculations may not actually be happening.
Thus, to achieve congressional goals of protection of intellectual property
rights and fairness in the sentencing process, amending the Sentencing
Guidelines is necessary.
B. Considering the Totality of the Circumstances
To establish the pecuniary harm caused by counterfeit goods, it is
important to conduct an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.
This means that courts should be urged to look at more than just the
Sentencing Guidelines. The IACC has previously recommended that the
Sentencing Commission include provisions that would cause courts to
consider "all aspects of the crime, the value of the legitimate goods, the
value of the fakes, harm to reputation, dilution of the trademark, and other
market forces." 229
Maintaining the presumption of street value is workable as long as the
Sentencing Guidelines are amended to provide more opportunities to apply
retail value. Including the IACC recommended analysis would prevent the
problems that those opposing street value have highlighted.230 As of now,
the Sentencing Guidelines only allow retail value when dealing with a
particular set of categories. 23' Many courts have found utilization of the
Guidelines to be difficult because of these categories. 232 The current
categories create a situation where everything revolves around whether or
not a particular label is affixed. This ignores the impact of those counterfeit
luxury goods that do not have the labels but still have brand recognition.
Brand recognition can occur by more than just a simple logo, and adopting
the perspective of brand recognition would best evaluate the pecuniary
harm to the brand owner.
227. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
229. See Bliss testimony, supra note 160, at 7.
230. See supra notes 44-50, 168-72 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 45.
232. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
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C. The Demand for the Unobtainable "Luxury"
The counterfeit market for luxury goods has begun to affect more than
just bankrolls of fashion houses. The desire for luxury goods is an obstacle
that makes ending trafficking of counterfeit goods difficult. Many believe
that the "want" and "need" of luxury will always be a part of society.233
The allure of luxury has much to do with why luxury items are the most
popular, and therefore most profitable, counterfeit items today.234 In his
book, Living it Up, James B. Twitchell discusses this apparent predicament
in the context of Shakespeare's King Lear:
True, Lear doesn't need these soldiers any more than Scrooge needed
silver, Midas needed gold, the characters on Friends need stuff from Crate
& Barrel, those shoppers on Rodeo/Worth/Madison Avenues need
handbags .... But not needing doesn't stop the desiring. Lear knows
that possessions are definitions-superficial meanings, perhaps ....
Without soldiers he is no king. Without a BMW there can be no yuppie,
without tattoos no adolescent rebel, without big hair no southwestern
glamourpuss, without Volvos no academic intellectuals, without cake no
Marie Antoinette. 2 35
Twitchell believes that we've brought ourselves to a "social decision, not
a[] moral one or even an economic one.'"236 A situation has developed
where wants have become needs. Individuals are willing to do
anything-young Asian women are working as prostitutes-to own
luxury.237 Knowing that luxury in a sense plagues our society, its existence
must be taken into consideration when determining how to fight the battle
of counterfeit luxury goods. The desire for status creates a unique human
element. The existence of that human element is one of the most difficult
obstacles facing the U.S. government in its efforts to end the counterfeit
luxury goods trade.
The incentive theory and "piracy paradox" presented by supporters of the
current standard of street value play an integral role in the context of luxury
goods.238 However, the numbers presented and discussed in Part I call into
question the validity of the arguments presented by commentators like
Barnett. 239 Even if it can be shown that the existence of counterfeit goods
expands the market for a particular design house, evidence still shows that
the existence of counterfeit goods takes profits away from businesses as
well as the government. 240 If the "piracy paradox" truly exists, this should
not mean that the intellectual property rights of the designer should not be
protected. The United States has long seen the importance of protecting
233. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
234. See supra Part I.C. 1.
235. TWITCHELL, supra note 5, at 276.
236. Id. at 277.
237. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Part II.A.3.
239. See supra Part I.C. 1.
240. See supra Part I.C. 1.
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intellectual property.241 As trademark law has developed, the emphasis has
been on protecting the consumer from potential confusion. Barnett's
arguments emphasize protection of the producer, which is contrary to a
fundamental aspect of federal trademark law.242 If we apply Barnett's
argument to counterfeiting then we will no longer be protecting the
consumer. The valuation of retail value protects both the producer and the
consumer. The current Sentencing Guidelines do not protect the consumer
in this way. The current standard follows Barnett's arguments of an
emphasis on protecting the producer. The world of counterfeiting has been
successful because of lax punishment.2 43  This does not protect the
consumer-instead it allows for a continuous flow of counterfeits in the
market that permits further confusion.
Individuals want to obtain items that denote status. This obstacle must be
overcome: "'The only way to stop counterfeiting... is to get people to
stop buying all this crap just to have these logos. We have to take it into
our own hands."' 244 To move away from the power of luxury, we have to
choose not to define ourselves by a brand name. The best way we may be
able to stop people from craving these items is to make sure they
understand the ramifications of participating in this not-so-victimless crime.
By taking a harder approach and allowing retail value to be more easily
applied, the public will be shown that counterfeiting is not tolerated. The
Sentencing Commission needs to move the Sentencing Guidelines toward a
different standard of valuation so that the consumers purchasing the items
do not view them as just cheap look-alikes, but rather as a violation of the
law that takes away from a company's profitability and success. The first
step in this direction is to end the valuation battle and to side with the
intellectual property owners and lessen the grip of luxury's power on
society.
CONCLUSION
Individuals crave the status that they receive from owning luxury goods.
The desire to own the unattainable has helped fuel trafficking of counterfeit
luxury goods. At the same time, governmental and congressional action
shows an acknowledgement for continued protection of intellectual
property rights. As the areas of trademark and copyright laws have
flourished, Congress has seen the need to develop a body of
anticounterfeiting legislation.
Congress continues to fight counterfeiting, especially in light of
connections to terrorism and other illegal activities. However, the
Sentencing Guidelines have been amended to address the proper valuation
of goods when dealing with sentencing of counterfeiters. Currently the
241. See supra Part I.A. 1.
242. See supra Part II.A.3.
243. See supra Part I.C.2.
244. See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 295.
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presumption in most cases is to use valuation according to street value.
This Note has attempted to highlight the growing conflict of whether street
value is the correct standard of valuation to be used. A growing number of
advocates believe in a change toward a valuation of full retail value.
In understanding the unique context of the counterfeit luxury goods
market, it has also been essential to understand the human elements
involved when luxury goods are counterfeited. The Sentencing
Commission should amend the Sentencing Guidelines to permit easier
application of full retail value. This standard of valuation will help dispel
the public's belief that counterfeiting is a harmless crime and encourage
support of public policy decisions to further protect intellectual property
rights.
Notes & Observations
